1. Inference vs. dialectics/ prasaṅga

A proposition whose subject is not presently cognized can be established via two kinds of employment of logic. When the subject is cognizable, we infer; when the subject is not cognizable, we use dialectics, viz., reductio ad absurdum (in Buddhism, prasaṅga).

Inference:

E.g.: There is fire in the mountain, because smoke is observed, just like [there is fire in] a stove.

The mountain that there is fire in, is cognizable, while the fire is not presently cognized. What is cognized is smoke.

Smoke is produced from fire; this is a causal relation that we can obtain via cognition. For example, the fire in a stove (we cognized before) produces smoke. Besides, as long as we walk to the fire in the mountain where the smoke is produced, we can see the fire from which the smoke is produced.

(Details: Any cognition invoves with the unity of “perception/intuition” and “inference (anumāna)/concept”; the unity is not a posteriori, and they are not united in any causal relation in time. The causality of cognition (causality of freedom or formal causality) is different from the causal relation between cognized objects (causality of nature). Once a cognition of any particular object appears, it appears with a determined way of thinking itself with certain possible associations of universals, giving criteria by means of which our empirical (a posteriori) inferences and judgments about the particular object could be either true, not true or irrelevant, in contrast to the free reflection of the cognition itself.）

Dialectics (Kantian)/ reductio ad absurdum:

When the subject of the proposition is impossible to cognize (not cognizable in sensible forms, i.e., in space and time), like “freedom,” “self-awareness” or “emptiness”.

The form of reductio ad absurdum: First we exhaust all logical possibilities of the proposition, like thesis and anti-thesis in Kant, four-corner argument in Buddhism (MMK by Nagārjūna; A by Dignāga), and then we indicate that every consequence of the logical possibility is contradictory to the experience. That means, the proposition cannot be established.

That is, when a rational concept is not supported by experience, the concept must be false.

On the contrary, when a rational concept is supported by experience, the concept must be true. Being supported by experience here does not mean having sensible ground, but means being not contradictory to the condition of cognition, especially to the condition of sensibility. That is, the rational concept that is empty of any empirical content is “allowed” to be thinkable by “perception/intuition”. Because, first, when a concept itself is logically problematic, it is automatically false. Second, it is exactly via the sensible condition of cognition that reality (in space and time) is first experienced. This is an obvious methodology in Kant. In Buddhism (N by Dignāga), “現、教力勝 ”i.e., perception and master's teachings, ultimately decide the indeterminable propositions between doctrines. Master's teachings are rooted in perception, too; master's teachings are the reports of real perception.

2. Orthogonality between free causality and phenomenal causality

The causality of freedom only necessitates the cause of cognition and its relation to all cognitions, while the causality of nature is only effective in the results of cognition, never on the cause. Reality is the system of the results of cognition which must be appearing and thinkable in certain ways.

3. Spiritual development:

Logic is identical, but has different employments. In cognition, since perception/intuition and inference/concept are united a priori, experience and reality are necessarily conditioned by phenomenal causality, which is the product of a crucial component of the function of logic. Regarding morality, this means the determination of desire (will) is subject to the object of cognition (the desired object) in phenomenal causal relation. On the other hand, the orthogonality of free causality and natural causality and ineffectiveness of the latter over the former ascertain the fact of free state. In cognition, although the subject of cognition becomes possible only insofar as both the cognizer and the cognized are established in cognition, the subject is not thus necessitated by the cognized. Meanwhile, there comes the possibility of valid and invalid judgment. In practice, will can be free from the determination of the sensible objects. From being situated in the simple conditioning of natural causality to being autonomous and spontaneous in the phenomenal causal exhaustion is a rational spiritual development. 

先驗邏輯與精神發展 -- 從陳那與康德的批判知識論談起 2016/12/12

1. 推論（inference）與辯證（dialectics）/歸謬論證（prasanga）

針對一個未被現證的命題，我們只能透過兩種方式去確定該命題是否成立。當命題的主題（subject）是一個可被認知的對象或狀態時，我們採取「推論」；當命題的主題是一個不可能被認知的對象或狀態時，我們採取辯證，或者歸謬論證，的方式，來確認命題是否成立。

推論：

如：彼山有火，以有煙故，如灶。

山裡面的火，是一個可以被認知但是命題設定的時候未被認知。

被認知到的，是煙。

煙由火生，這是一個可以被認知到的因果關聯，例如灶裡的火可以生煙；且我們若真的走到山裡彼煙生處，我們是可以看到是有火的，且由火生煙。

（細節：任何的認知，都必然牽涉到「現量/直觀」與「比量/概念」的統合。而現量與概念的統合並非後天的，並非關聯於時間之內的因果關係，認知的因果（自由因果、形式因果），不同於被認識的對象之間的因果關係（自然因果）。而是任何現量「出現（appear）」時，其必隱含著其一切可被思及並已確定（determined）的「正當性（allowability）」。Once a cognition of any particular object appears, it appears with a determined way of thinking itself with certain possible associations of universals, giving criteria by means of which our empirical (a posteriori) inferences and judgments about the particular object could be either true, not true or irrelevant, in contrast to the free reflection of the cognition itself.）

辯證/歸謬論證：

當命題的主題不可能被認知（不可通過感性形式，即時間與空間，被認知），例如「自由」、「自證」或「空性」。

歸謬的形式：窮舉該命題的所有邏輯可能，如正反（康德），如四句（龍樹中論、陳那觀論），並且指出每一列舉出的邏輯可能，都導致與「經驗」相衝突的結果（「實則不然」）。這表示，該命題不可能成立。

例如：龍樹中論第一品觀因緣不成。例如：康德任一paralogism。

也就是說，當一個理性概念，不受經驗支持時，該概念必不為真。

相對地，當一個理性概念，受經驗支持時，其概念為必然地真。這裡所謂受經驗支持，並不是指該概念有認知基礎，而是指不與任何認知條件相違背，特別是「現量/直觀」這個條件，換句話說，是當這個沒有感性經驗內涵的理性概念，可被現量（經驗本身）允許為可思的。兩個原因，其一，當一個概念本身含有邏輯錯誤時，其本身便不成立，故立破關鍵在於直觀條件。其二，正是透過感性條件，（在時間與空間之中的）現實 才真正被經驗。這在康德是十分明顯的方法論，在陳那，因論「現、教力勝」是決斷不可能被認知的命題的原則，其中，「教（現證者的報告）」的根源仍是「現」。

2. 自由的因果與現象的因果之正交關係：

自由因果只有限定認知條件與所有一切可能認知之間的關係，而自然因果只在認知的結果之間有效，不涉及認知條件。（The causality of freedom only necessitates the cause of cognition and its relation to all cognitions, while the causality of nature is only effective in the results of cognition, never on the cause. ）現實，就是作為認識的結果的體系，必然是出現的（appearing）且可合理思及的。

3. 精神發展：

邏輯是同一邏輯，一方面因為任何的認知，都牽涉到「現量/直觀」與「比量/概念」的先天統合，經驗與現實一定是受限於現象的因果制約。於道德面來說，便是欲望（意志）順服於認知對象（欲望對象）而決定。然而，自由的因果與現象的因果之正交關係，以及後者對前者的無效，確保的是自由狀態的事實。於認知，認識主體雖因認知而令認知者與被認知者同時成立，但不被被認知者綁定，也有判斷正確與否的可能。於實踐，便是意志可以自由不為感性對象決定。由單純在自然因果制約中生活，提升到能自主處在自然因果脈絡之中，則是一合理的精神發展。

Chakrabarti’s thesis is clear: absence is real, and qualms about its reality are due to the failure to distinguish between not-being (absence) and non-being. However, his conclusion is obscure. Towards the end of the chapter, he discusses emptiness, then Bhattacharya’s “feeling of absent feeling”, and then returns to emptiness. It is unclear what Chakrabarti’s stance is regarding emptiness. In introducing Bhattacharya, he says “Following the work of K. C. Bhattacharya, I would like to conclude by hinting at the deep significance of the feeling of an absent feeling for jettisoning the dispute between self-ism and no-self-ism” (21). Perhaps Chakrabarti is trying to say that with the notion of “void as full” (23), no-self and self attain a contemplative identification and so the dispute is jettisoned. Even so, it is still unclear whether then Mahayana Buddhists and Bhattacharya are envisioning the same ultimate goal. It is also unclear whether Bhattacharya’s method of finding the self requires abandoning of the law of non-contradiction, as is said of the Madhyamaka logic of emptiness. Finally, it is unclear why reaching such contemplative state “befits only those who have painstakingly argued their analytic way” (23).

2. Organization

The chapter is perhaps too comprehensive for a chapter of 20 pages.

3. Absence as Perceived

A worry has been raised that there is no argument for why absence is something perceived rather than conceptualized. There may be a logical (mathematical?) problem with the very conception. We dwelled on this topic for some time, discussing how we might or might not be able to perceive absence, but as far as the chapter goes, it is true that the topic is under-discussed. The only place Chakrabarti argues for the perceptibility of absence is where he says “The fact that we have to recall or think of the absentee before our knowledge of its absence in a site can arise does not show that the knowledge is inferential or indirect. Any particular perceptual judgment, even affirmative ones, is usually mediated by our mastery or memory of the world or concept by which we identify the perceived object. That does not necessarily render the judgment non-perceptual” (14). First of all, Chakrabarti only argues that cognition of absence is not merely conceptual in the Buddhist sense; i.e. conceptual = inferential. Second, there is no explanation why if the cognition in question is not conceptual, it has to be perceptual. It would be okay in the context of Buddhist epistemology because Buddhists acknowledge perception and inference as the sole means of valid cognition, but Nyaya epistemology, which Chakrabarti is presumably endorsing, has two more, namely comparison and testimony. So, even if Chakrabarti may think cognition of absence is obviously not due to comparison or testimony, some explanation is needed.

4. Beginning of the Universe

Chakrabarti begins the chapter by asking about the origin of the universe, and casually denies the possibility of genesis ex nihilo and moves onto discuss absence. The topic is not thematically addressed for the rest of the discussion. However, a fuller account might be extractable from the discussion of absolute nihilism. Chakrabarti argues that, in Indian logic, ∀x means “for a plurality of x’s without any remainder” (18) and therefore, the nihilist’s assertion “all is nonbeing” is self-contradictory. Now the genesis ex nihilo assertion “in the beginning there was nothing” might likewise be self-contradictory. Or is it? ∃y∀x(Ty&~Exy) there is some y such that y is time and nothing exists in that time; but since by using the universal quantifier we are admitting some plurality of x’s, the assertion is self-contradictory… I don’t know if I am making sense.

Some general claims have been challenged. Firstly, is there a clear distinction between western philosophy and Asian philosophy, such that western philosophy began with investigation of being and existence, while Asian philosophy was concerned with nothingness and emptiness from start? To this, we agreed that there is no clear distinction but also that the authors are well aware of this lack and make due qualifications. Second challenge concerned whether it is accurate to say that all Asian philosophers represented in this volume regarded nothingness as “a distinctly identifiable constituent of our world” or “furniture of the world” (xii). We agreed that this is not true of all Asian philosophers represented in this volume; for instance Nishida’s Absolute Nothingness is neither distinctly identifiable nor furniture of the world.

2. Representation accuracy of the Synopsis

We noticed that the synopsis might not be entirely reflective of the authors’ intent. For instance, the synopsis takes Chakrabarti to be claiming that there are positive truth-makers for absence, but in his text there is no mention of truth-makers. It is unclear whether Chakrabarti would be committed to the claim that the synopsis attributes to him. As we move forth it might be advisable to compare the chapters with the synopsis for the latter’s accuracy.

3. Target audience of the Book

The Introduction has it that “everyone in the fields of Asian and comparative philosophy” (xii) will benefit from the book. In this connection we set out to ask ourselves, as we read through the chapters, how many of them contain analytic philosophical reasoning. Depending on the extent and relevance, this volume may benefit people in analytic philosophy as well.

Y Deguchi 10 Dec 2014

• Virtues: None.

• Vices

• No definite conclusion: ‘The realization of emptiness thus depends on the attachment of a semantics that can accommodate it” (63)

• This is right. But it is a matter of off course.

• Then what is the semantics? No definite answer though he suggests a Carnapean pragmatic account of truth (62)

• How can the Carnapean semantics be applied to Nargarjuna? How can it rescue him from his predicament? Answers have yet to be articulate.

• Though much ink are spelled out in unnecessary expositions, the crucial part on the pragmatic semantics remains sketchy.

• Another vice; only a little original contribution: the suggestion of the pragmatic semantics.

• Another vice: No direct reference to the original text. Most references are indirect, and all are based on English translations.

• Inconsistency: Based on Jan’s readings, Koji admits that “Nagarjuna mostly employs the second sense of svabhava and we hardly see him using its other senses. BUT Koji’s summery incorporates all the three meanings (see the bottom lines of p.56).

• A small but crucial typo: Nagarjuna is thus arguing against the notion of svabhava that can NOT be found in Abgidharma literature.

• Expositions on Nargarjunarian semantic are poor: Why is Nargarjuna’s semantics Russellian? Etc. (I omit details.)

• The pragmatic interpretation seems problematic.

• “For Carnap, the question about truth comes down to our practice. It has to do with the “planning and optimization of the future of the species”.

• “… by adopting a pragmatic account of truth, the Madhyamika can accommodate norms embodied in Nagarjuna’s statements in terms of pragmatic efficacy.”

• Then problems are; What is the purpose of Nagarjuna’s norms? It is the planning and optimization of the future of the species? Probably not. It is the attainment of Nirvana. More importantly, this move leads us to a relativism,according to which no rebuttal against opponents is possible.

• Suppose that Nargarjuna and his opponent don’t share their purpose. They have different purposes in their linguistic activities. Then pragmatic values differ across them. This means that they have different truths. And this is quire legitimate as far as we adopt one or another pragmatic semantics. Among different people with different purposes, no discussions, rebuttals, argumentation are meaningless. There is no single truth according to which different campus are evaluated. Simply they are using different notion of truth. Carnap is happy to accept this relativistic situation. But Buddhists such as Nargarjuna not.

The middle way, as Nāgārjuna himself characterizes in MMK 15.7[2], is to leave the side of existence (bhāvānta) and the side of non-existence (abhāvānta) not for the middle position between the two ends but for another different dimension. Let's see the passage in Saṃyuktāgama (《雜阿含經》) Nāgārjuna refers to first:

佛告[跳-兆+散]陀迦旃延：「世間有二種依，若有、若無，為取所觸。取所觸故，或依有、或依無。若無此取者心境繫著，使不取、不住、不計我，苦生而生，苦滅而滅，於彼不疑、不惑，不由於他而自知，是名正見，是名如來所施設正見。所以者何？世間集如實正知見，若世間無者不有，世間滅如實正知見，若世間有者無有，是名離於二邊說於中道⋯」

Buddha told Kātyāyana: “There is a duality (dvayaṃ) that the world relies on (依), namely, existence (atthitañ[3]/astitā) and non-existence (natthitañ/nastitā), which are to be taken (取) via the touch [of cognitive faculty, object and consciousness] (觸). What is taken via the touch is [the world that relies on] either existence or non-existence. Without taking, the dependent relation between mind and object ceases itself to take [any object], to dwell [in any object] or to believe in [the reality of it-]self. [Without taking,] let it suffer when suffering comes; let it cease [to suffer] when suffering goes, and to this one holds no doubt because this is known not via the other. This is the right view (sammādiṭṭhi/samyagdṛṣṭi), and this is called the right view that is established by Buddha. Why is that? Arising (集) of the world as how it is correctly seen and understood shows the non-existence of the non-existing side of the world, while cessation (滅) of the world as how it is correctly seen and understood shows the non-existence of the existing side of the world. That is called the middle way which avoids the two sides....”

On the one hand, via the touch (觸), namely, via the realization of cognition, the world arises and ceases; on the other hand, without the touch, taking is impossible and hence not only taking ceases but also existence and non-existence cease. When the arising and cessation is impossible, i.e., when the world that arises and ceases is viewed correctly (that the world arises or ceases just in our taking the touch), then “the non-existence of the world by itself (the impossibility of the world by itself without our taking the touch)” and “the existence and non-existence of the world that are taken via the touch” entail each other. The middle way is thus understood as a view to strictly confine the changes (arising and cessation) within the realm of phenomenon, where everything is only possible after the touch is taken, i.e., everything is only possible as the object of realized cognition; at meanwhile, the very same view also bears with an awareness that without taking the touch, i.e., without the realization of cognition, arising and cessation is not possible. In another words, the right view of the middle way demands an introduction of epistemological consideration (with or without taking the cognitive touch) into the simple phenomenal duality, which reveals the lack of the non-phenomenal support for the phenomenal dualism. However, although this passage obviously introduces the other perspective of epistemology, Nāgārjuna's elaboration of this introduced view nonetheless struggles with the phenomenal world mainly.

Nāgārjuna tries to show this view in various parts of MMK (representatively MMK 1 and MMK 15) by showing that the concept of phenomenal changes (arising and cessation) and the concept of non-phenomenal reality deny each other. He almost always adopts the logical apparatus of catuṣkoṭi/tetralemma, a four-cornered exhaustion of logical possibility consisting of “p, -p, both p & -p, neither p nor -p” in Indian logic, to display his argument of prasajya-pratiṣeda (proof by contradiction歸謬否定). By showing that a thesis leads to contradictions in each corner of catuṣkoṭi, the thesis is rejected. For example (MMK 1.1[4]), given a thesis that things exist, the four corners are that they come into existence either (a) from itself, (b) from others (not from itself), (c) from both itself & others and (d) from neither itself nor others. If (a), according to Pingala's explanation[5], first, this contradicts the fact of dependent origination that everything must come into existence in certain conditions, and second, self-origination would invite the problem of infinite regress – infinite repeats of self's producing itself. Since (a) collapses, (b) collapses as well, because the others have to come to existence first; then it fails as we have seen in (a). (c) entails (a) and (b), so (c) cannot stand, either. It is also bizarre to say that things come into existence from nothing, because the uncaused existence would be eternal existence, which does not fit the idea of dependent origination. So (d) falls. Then, the thesis that things exist is rejected. This method is tricky, because the rejection of the thesis does not imply the establishment (or rejection) of the anti-thesis. With this method, Nāgārjuna struggles with the phenomenal predicaments and displays that every possible ontological assertion (assertions about the non-phenomenal reality) must contradict the phenomenal reality. Hence, that the concept of dependent origination and the concept of non-phenomenal reality deny each other is true.

We can understand the middle way to leave the two sides in three steps. First, existence and non-existence are both recognized and restricted to be phenomenal (dependent origination) – only as phenomenon we could know and say that something exists or not. Second, phenomenon is not recognized to have any non-phenomenal foundation; otherwise phenomenon would be unable to change (between existence and non-existence), and this is counterintuitive. Third, first and second claims one identical truth: reality is only phenomenal (“conventional” in Nāgārjuna's term), and thus phenomenon is empty (without any non-phenomenal foundation) in nature, ultimately speaking. Putting these three steps into the background of the north-south split in India, we can say that the first step is the south influence on the north thesis and remarks a new page into the Mahāyāna thesis of existence, viz., existence is only phenomenal. This signifies a clear difference between Hināyāna Sarvāstivādins which believes in atoms being the non-phenomenal substrata and the later Mahāyāna school of existence, Yogācāra, which denies the ultimate reality of atoms. The other steps are the (conventional) “construction” of the south thesis with the philosophical technology from the north. This is the conciliation of the south-north split by Nāgārjuna.

Footnote:

[1] 以有空義故，一切法得成(MMK 24.14). Translation follows Luetchford (2002).

[2] 佛能滅有無，於化迦旃延，經中之所說，離有亦離無 (MMK 15.7). Luetchford (2002): “When he taught Kātyāyana, the Buddha used the power of existence and non-existence to deny both views: that an innate essence exists and that it does not exist.” The story about Buddha's teaching Kātyāyana is found in Saṃyuktāgama《雜阿含經》vol. 12 in Taisho Tripitaka《大正藏》, T02n0099_p0085c17(00)~p0086a03(10).

[3] Sanskrit reconstruction refers to the citation Ye Shaoyong (2011) from Saṃyuktā-Nikāya, L. Feer, ed. 6 vols., London (PTS), (1884-1904). The translation is of the Chinese text.

[4] 諸法不自生，亦不從他生，不共、不無因，是故知無生。Luetchford (2002): “Things do not come into existence from self or from others, nor from a combination of both. Yet things are not without cause.”

[5] The commentary of Pingala (青目) is now only preserved in Chinese translation byKumārajīva (鳩摩羅什, 409).    

Reference:

Luetchford, Michael Eido (2002). Between Heaven and Earth : a Translation of Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, with Commentary and Grammatical Analysis. Bristol [England] : Windbell Publications.Williams, Paul (2004). The Origins and Nature of Mahāyāna Buddhism. London & New York : Routledge.

Ye, Shaoyong 葉少勇(2011). Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.《中論頌．梵藏漢合校、導讀、譯注》. Shanghai: Zhongxi Shuju中西書局。

Ven. Yinshun 印順 (1952/2012). Zhong guan lun song jiang ji. 《中觀論頌講記》. Hong Kong: Zheng-wen 正聞. Reprint in Chupei 竹北: Zheng-wen 正聞, 2012.