汪純瑩 ＠ 政大 2015/10/22 (Event Info)

在陳那進行哲學工作之時，他面對的哲學脈絡大抵區分作非佛教的正理學派、佛教小乘中的有部世親、經部世親，以及大乘的初期唯識（也就是唯識世親），以及初期中觀（也就是龍樹）。近代學界例如 Singh 認為，確定陳那是哪個世親的忠誠傳承者，可以幫助我們確定陳那自身的哲學立場。

從正理派所持的，肯定認識對象與認識主體的外在實在性，通過有部否認認識主體的外在實在性、經部所持的 akara 作為認識的必要角色（也就是認識論中的representationalism）、到唯識與中觀的對外在實在性的絕對拒絕，看似是一個承認外在實在性的降冪階層，而陳那究竟是效忠哪一個立場，也往往被認為是詮釋陳那哲學的一個關鍵問題。

主流意見來說，由於法稱後來成為陳那哲學最主要的發揚者，其傾向於經部的詮釋立場，也就過渡到了陳那身上。據Stcherbatsky（1932:39-46）， 陳那學在印藏傳承中，大抵上只分做三種學派，最大宗也是最有哲學意義的，就是法稱的文獻學派（direct philological school），其餘的兩支，一則將佛的量與凡夫的量二分而稱說凡夫無法進一步探討佛的量，只能將陳那對量的處理當作是支持大乘佛教教條（即「將佛的本體當作是一個絕對的不可知」）的支持性理論看待，另外一支，則單純將陳那的語句當作課誦修法的台詞。而當代國際學界中的佛家知識論研究，法稱的研究成果斐然，很自然地，將陳那哲學的詮釋傾向於經部，也成了意見領袖們的主要意見，然而，從廣義漢傳脈絡來看，對這樣的定調的不滿，時有所聞，從呂澂、武邑尚邦、服部正明，到我們大家熟識的桂紹隆、姚治華、鄭偉宏、褚俊傑等等，都有明確文字表明對此意見的不滿。這個不滿其實其來有自，整個漢傳佛教對陳那的認識當中，對法稱，是不甚熟悉的，且，陳那是擺放在龍樹的傳承者的位置被看待。這我們可以從呂澂的處理，乃至於印順導師的著作中，都可以觀察到。

當然陳那理應有他自己的哲學立場，但在談論這個之前，我們先得注意到一個問題，大乘佛教來到了世親乃至於陳那，已經不如同龍樹一樣處在於一個對外擴張的情境，而是守城的情境，對內的團結，理應比對外的外交更為重要。陳那因明被當作為一個調節佛教內外的一個「溝通平台」，我們要將這個平台往左延伸到經部、到唯識還是甚至於到中觀，這代表著我們對這個平台的預期效益有多高。事實上，倘若這個平台只能夠延伸到經部，就會變成是小乘與外道合成一氣的圈圈，卻反而一起不見容於大乘的空宗立場，對於佛教對此溝通平台的需求來說，似乎不甚合理，若要將這個平台延伸到中觀，那麼法稱的唯識立場，特別是他將有相、無相唯識放置於二諦論的這種方便觀是否具有充分的哲學量能去支撐這種延伸，事實上是非常令人質疑的。哲學量能的不足，簡單概說，在於當遇到空有之間最爭議的核心議題時，是否我們能輕易地退回到一個大乘的「不可論之」的形上學教條，這便是哲學量能高低的判斷標準。

陳那自身的哲學立場與經部的立場，若經過細密的哲學處理，應可被指出是「互斥」的，從陳那對「量」定義的改寫、二量的截然劃分、二重顯像與自證理論、乃至於明白地指出「認識」的作用並非一個實際發生的事實等等，細節的討論一時間無法細談。不過，我們可以從 representationalism、或者說「間接認識論」相對於「直接認識論」的哲學立場上的衝突來看待，或許可以更容易地進入這個「互斥」的核心處。在此圖表中，唯有經部是間接認識論，其餘的應該都是某一種類的直接認識論。事實上，對於「representation」作為反映外在現實的一個必要介質這個要求，代表的是對外在現實的相當高度的默認，而且是將外在現實當作是representation的自然因。傳統中的外在實在論者，實則不需要一個 representation層，進而直接落入內外二元區分的經驗範圍；傳統上的觀念論者，斷不會接受外在實在作為認識的自然因。聚焦在經部的間接認識論上，外在現實與representation當中的現實之間的矛盾（也就是這二者不可兼得），其實通過類似龍樹對自性的挑戰，就已然是個 representationalists 必須要回答卻無法回答的問題了，相較而言，就屬經部最遠離龍樹哲學立場。反過來說，只要有部與正理派等直接認識論者接受了「除了認識本身之外，其他一切事物才具有外在實在性；認識本身，不是一種外在實在」，那麼在這張圖表上，除了經部以外的其他派別，理應都會承認同樣的一種哲學形上觀。換言之，對大乘者而言，一切世俗有本來就是「外在實在」的，這部份沒有錯，是外在實在的，意味著是在「空間與時間」當中是實在的，因為空間與時間之中對我們來說，意思就是「外在的」，但這不直接默認了同時也外在於認識而實在，這一點大乘者自身必須分別的十分清楚。再來，對於有部與正理派來說，同樣也將外在實在定義在「於時間與空間」當中具有實在性，便可滿足其外在實在論的要求，但是，同時，他們也應該分別的十分清楚的是，這樣的外在實在性，並不外於認識而是必須限縮在一切可能的認識範圍之內。也就是說，當有部與正理派修正了其直接認識論的形上學預設（取消這個預設），其直接認識論與大乘的直接認識論是可相通的。

附議：

漢傳因明源流，與阿含中的 Proceduralism – Holism 之爭

一、龍樹引雜阿含 13.306 ，觸及了「認識論」與「解脫」之間的關係，亦即，「觸」的消解，便是解脫之道。

二、觸與意的關係之爭議，源於小乘。五遍行中，觸、意誰先誰後（過去意）？或者應是同時（等無間意）？或者不應談論時間差（現在意）？事實上，小乘諸派的分裂，除了戒律上的意見相左之外，這個爭議也是重要的分歧點。

三、意識之「實在性」與「諸多自我分別的假施設，如根境識、如五遍行」之間的關係，可大概區分為 proceduralism與holism。

四、例如，案印順，有部可被歸為proceduralism，經部可被歸為 holism，然經部的 holism與其representationalism 之間有哲理上的衝突，致使經部無法系統性的更進一步發展。

五、倘若觸先於意，實踐便無可能，因為觸是他力的（hetronomous）、意是自力的（autonomous）。倘若意先於觸，則識未成則何能言意？所以，將認識論上面的區分，單單當作「意」的思想區分，而且不直接隱含本體上的區分，這樣的 holism，應該是更為可取的解法。

六、在這個議題的關照中，漢傳佛教對陳那哲學的定位，應該是個較為恰當的定位。現量：holism；比量：單純於思想中的區分，是我們必然拿來理解的方式，但是其應用範圍不可超出時間空間形式當中的認識對象，特別是認識自身。認識論的區分，單單只是認識本身結構上的特色，以及是認識對自我的一種認識，不應直接導向於任何認識之外的架構或狀態。

• slides.pdf

Does Freedom Contradict Causal Exhaustion?

– A Critical-Epistemological Resolution

KU-NCCU Graduate Roundtable on Asian Philosophy 2015.3.20

Gustav Chun-Ying WANG

updated 2015/03/18

updated 2015/03/17

If one wants the empirical reality, one has to (1) admit freedom (viz., self-awareness in Dignāga) and (2) give up the world in itself as ultimate cause (viz., Nāgārjuna). Then, one has to admit (1) epistemology is prior to ontology and (2) practice (freedom) is prior to theory (cognitive reality). Such priority should be on behalf of truth and we the best can only adopt it as an attitude; we should not take it in time (in reality/convention/appearance) or in logic. When one is in a moral situation or in the dying breath, if one could persist and stay also in freedom in stead of only in reality (the object-oriented desire), that must be much nicer, both on behalf of ethics and soteriological concerns, not for the sake of faith or ideal only. Life-and-death, or fear, etc., are resulting cognitions; freedom and each of them, distinct from each other though, do not contradict each other; they do not remove each other. To misidentify resulting cognitions as the cause of human being is the root of all fears and vexations. To put freedom and phenomenal causal exhaustion in the same field of force and make them contradictory is one of the most troublesome, rooted confusions in humanity. 

1. Freedom and Causal Exhaustion – West (Kant) and East (Buddhism)

Kant has a very good display of these notions and the problem (in the 3rd antinomy); I just borrow it to show the problem. The Thesis of the antinomy is: beside of the causal law of nature, it is necessary also to admit the causal law of freedom, that there must be a cause without any preceding cause. Argument: if there is no free cause, there is no sufficient determination of the previous causal conditions and then nothing can happen. The Anti-thesis is: there is no freedom; any thing that occurs must have its cause(s) in the previous time stage – (the law in the 2nd analogy). Argument: if there is free cause, the law of natural causality (2nd analogy) loses its universal validity. Kant's position: both the thesis and the anti-thesis are true, and the only resolution to this antinomy is transcendental idealism, i.e.*, if we abandon the pre-critical metaphysical assumptions such as the transcendent reality of the first cause and, instead, accept that the first cause rests in cognition, i.e*, if we stop viewing this issue in the world in itself and begin to view this in the situation of cognition.

The seemingly contradictory point is obvious: we want the absolute cause (uncaused cause) to give a full account for causality and we want to maintain the law of natural causality that everything that is causally effective must have its cause in the previous time stage. On the one hand, we don't want the infinite regress of causation (if only with the law of 2nd analogy alone, causation is problematic, because the complete determination of the series of previous causal conditions is lack); on the other hand, we want the causal network in the phenomenal world to be comprehensive so that the law of the 2nd analogy has to be exhaustive in all phenomena (let us call it “phenomenal causal exhaustion”). The corer issue is: we want to preserve the law of natural causality (otherwise, we would render up the universality of natural laws for sciences and the applicative legitimacy of logic performances) for the sake of empirical realism, but preserving it seems to contradict itself in both the thesis and the anti-thesis. The only way to clear away the difficulty is to succeed in identifying (a) the orthogonality of the causality in time (nature) and the causality not in time (freedom) and (b) their necessary unity in a person (a cognizer).

*

This is also a core issue in Buddhism, especially the Mahāyāna Buddhism. On the one hand, we want it to be true that there is a chance for us to get rid of saṃsāra; on the other hand, we want to maintain a comprehensive causal relativity among all possible “pratītyasamutpānna (緣起法)” (that which arises and ceases). In Nāgārjuna, we can see his rejection to the reality of any “absolute cause” -- atoms and pramāṇa-s being the uncaused objective and subjective cause of all dharmas, so that the comprehensive causal relativity among all dharmas can be preserved (the empirical reality is wanted); nonetheless, he still has to leave a space for a positive account for the ultimacy of a status free from the the causal chains in saṃsāra – nirvana – and for the ultimacy of “pratītyasamutpāda (緣起性)” (the principle that everything must co-arise with multiple conditions, which is equivalent to "śūnyatā 空性"). However, no argument for this is provided except a persuasion that we must have a proper understanding of the two-truth distinction in MMK 24.

I think it is less controversial to maintain the phenomenal causal exhaustion; even the non-Buddhist should be very happy about it (that's why Buddhist epistemology is said to admit a common ground with the realists). It excludes the non-Buddhists and Hīnayāna Buddhists in the Indian context when we further specify that the idea of the absolute reality of any absolute cause (atoms as the ultimate real and pramāṇa-s as the ultimate real) cannot go along with the idea of the phenomenal causal exhaustion (Nāgārjuna's contribution). It then becomes controversial when we come to consider to include the thesis of freedom. Perhaps it is okay for most of us to say that Nāgārjuna must leave the space for the two ultimate claims: nirvana and pratītyasamutpāda. It may be okay for us to say pratītyasamutpāda as a true claim can be regarded as an idea or concept without any ultimate ontic (transcendent) reality, but it would upset many people to say that nirvana is the same case, for some ethical and soteriological concerns. Yogacarins (e.g., Vasubandhu & Dignāga) may be said to have greater interest in arguing for the thesis of freedom and go into the study of epistemology. Some Mādhyamikas (e.g., Candrakīrti) disagree with this approach because of the overwhelming worry in the anti-thesis in Nāgārjuna's works. Some Mādhyamikas (Bhaviveka) may not want to skip this question of freedom and bring back the treatment into the context of epistemology in Nāgārjuna's original concern of the middle way (Kātyāyana passage in Saṃyuktāgama cited in MMK 15.7) and move closer to the Yogācāra approach. Some Yogācārins (Dhamarkīrti), however, identify themselves so much with their opponent (Candrakīrti) in the importance of the phenomenal causal exhaustion that they just dilute the weight of the thesis of freedom in their introducing too much ontic value understanding Buddhist epistemology. No matter how history goes, the problem of the third antinomy remains, even in this Buddhist context; Kant does not hold the patent of the problem. Because of this and in this philosophical context, the Mādhyamaka effort in appreciating epistemology should be appreciated.

2. Defending Kant's Transcendental Idealism on the Thesis

Schopenhaur, Kemp Smith (1962), Strawson (1966) questioned, in the reconstruction of Allison (1983/2004):

*

Gustav's Supporting Allison's Defense:

3. The Mādhyamaka-Yogācāra Conflict

One patent disagreement in the Mādhyamaka-Yogācāra conflict is: while Mādhyamaka rejects every ontological assertion about the ultimate reality, many Yogācārins are understood to expound their tenets as supporting that there must be something ultimately real/true – mind, consciousness or means of cognition (pramāṇa量) – that makes every phenomenon (resulting cognition) possible. Mādhyamikas must reject this ontological assertion in order to maintain that the principle of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), viz., the principle of causality, must exhaust all those which arise (originate) in phenomena – any realized phenomenon must be determined through comprehensive and complicated causal network rather than any determined particular cause(s), so that all possible phenomena are thus altogether be placed in the scope of the conventional. The positive ontological assertion of the ultimate reality obviously jeopardizes the phenomenal exhaustion of causality and invites contradictions to the explanation, because the ultimate reality, which must be an absolute cause (because no other determined cause can precede it), itself would be free from the mutual dependence of originations. On the contrary, its negative ontological assertion invites annihilation (uccheda, 斷滅). Yet, the suspension of assertion makes the school unable to sufficiently account for either the apodixis of its thesis-assumption, viz., the necessary exhaustion of the principle of pratītyasamutpāda itself in all pratītyasamutpanna-s (all those which arise conditionally) which accounts for their complete relativity at the theoretical level, or the necessity and purposiveness of cultivation in Buddhism in general at the practical level. To further account for the phenomenal exhaustion of causality and the purposiveness of Buddhist practice, as well as to defend the school of existence (有宗), Yogācārins subscribe to and further refine epistemology within Buddhism. Naturally, to defend their own school, later Mādhyamikas criticize this attempt in return.

To deny both the absolute objective cause and the absolute subjective cause means to deny any particularly determined causal relation – either (a) the particularly determined causal relation between objects themselves or between the non-phenomenal object and the unconscious production of perception in the perceptual faculty, and (b) the particularly determined causal relation between the cognitive faculty and the resulting cognition in awareness. The Mādhyamika-Yogācāra conflict is on the latter.  Exactly at this point, the resolution of the thesis of freedom and the anti-thesis against freedom matters in Mahāyāna Buddhism.  And that's why a critical revisit of Dignāga's epistemology, which can support the orthogonality of the causality in time and the causality in freedom, is demanded.

4. The Epistemic Situation Talks

Once a cognition of any particular object appears, it appears with a determined way of thinking itself with certain (associations of) universals, giving criteria by means of which our empirical (a posteriori) inferences about the particular object could be either true, not true or irrelevant. When a particular thing of color appears, it appears together with all its possibilities to be thought, including, e.g., being non-eternal, so that the universal, non-eternity, could be applied to the appearance of this particular thing of color. Because the appearance of the particular object can be thought as “the thing of color” and, under the same circumstance, viz., upon being given the same appearance of the particular, can be thought as “non-eternal,” the expression “this thing of color is noneternal” makes sense and becomes meaningful.

In the same way, the appearance of any particular object can be recognized repeatedly via inferential marks. For instance, when one perceives smoke (the mark of fire), one has the re-cognition (pratyabhijñāna) of “the same fire” (Hattori 1968:81). This is because the smoke perceived is contained in the manifoldness of the appearance of the same fire cognized before, at the specific time and space. Even when one pays no attention to the smoke in his or her first-glance cognition of the particular fire, once the particular fire appears, it appears with the possibility to be thought as being associated with this smoke, so that under the same circumstance, viz., upon being given the same appearance of the particular fire, the possibility is always open for the cognizer to pick up. Upon the same base, the inferential mark, smoke, as produced by particular fire, works to produce recognitions of the same fire, so long as the appearance is consistent regarding the factors of space, time and causality (in a coherent web of experience). Similarly, a case of a kind of object can be recognized because the appearance of the case share similarities in its manifoldness with the other cases.  

On the one hand, objects have to appear to our mind in the manifold of the a priori intuition, contained by the way they can only be received, viz., in space and time; on the other hand, our thought has to be based upon the thorough synthesis of the manifold being “gone through, taken up, and combined in a certain way” so that the synthesis of the particular appearance with such manifoldness and the conceptual spontaneity results in a cognition. The receptive manifold in sensibility and the spontaneous unity in understanding must be united a priori, so that the being with intellectual intuition would be omniscient and even omnipotent – as Kant writes “that understanding through whose self-consciousness the manifold of intuition would at the same time be given, an understanding through whose representation of objects of this representation would at the same time exist, would not require a special act of the synthesis of the manifold for the unity of consciousness” (KRV B 139). However, human understanding, which only thinks but does not intuit, “does require (such a special act)” (ibid.). That is, the synthesis of the two unities is a priori, in the sense that so long as any particular appears, it must appear in a certain way that all its possible understandings must be contained. If there were such a being whose understanding is intuitive, it would be the world in itself with self-awareness. However, human understanding is not intuitive. The a priori synthesis of the manifold for the unity of human consciousness must be “the first principle,” so that “human understanding cannot even form for itself the least concept of another possible understanding, either one that would intuit itself or one that, while possessing a sensible intuition, would possess one of a different kind than one grounded in space and time” (ibid.). Thus, any object appears to us must appear in the same space and time and at the same while must appear to only the subject (very similar to Dignāga's two-fold appearance theory in PS(V) 1.11ab). Because of this, the world is known by us in space and time, and we are separated from the world. Nonetheless, the unity of receptive manifold and spontaneous unity works for human beings because the a priori synthesis, which entails the a priori synthesis of “apprehension in intuition,” “reproduction in imagination” and “recognition in the concept,” too, (KRV A 97, 98-110; also reminding us of Dignāga's pramāṇa-prameya-phala-being-not-separate thesis in PS(V) 1.10) is the necessary condition of all possible cognitions. Hence, in the world, we, the cognizers, could explore bit by bit the possible valid knowledge in experience – without needing any a priori ontological basis.      

Chinese text: 

佛告[跳-兆+散]陀迦旃延：「世間有二種依，若有、若無，為取所觸。取所觸故，或依有、或依無。若無此取者心境繫著，使不取、不住、不計我，苦生而生，苦滅而滅，於彼不疑、不惑，不由於他而自知，是名正見，是名如來所施設正見。所以者何？世間集如實正知見，若世間無者不有，世間滅如實正知見，若世間有者無有，是名離於二邊說於中道…」

Buddha told Kātyāyana: “There is a duality (dvayaṃ) that the world relies on (依), namely, existence (atthitañ[1]/astitā) and non-existence (natthitañ/nastitā), which are to be taken (取) via the touch [of cognitive faculty, object and consciousness] (觸). What is taken via the touch is [the world that relies on] either existence or non-existence. Without taking, the dependent relation between mind and object ceases itself to take [any object], to dwell [in any object] or to believe in [the reality of it-]self. [Without taking,] let it be when suffering comes; let it cease when suffering goes, and to this one holds no doubt because this is known not via the other. This is the right view(sammādiṭṭhi/samyagdṛṣṭi), and this is called the right view  that is established by Buddha. Why is that? Arising (集) of the world as how it is correctly seen and understood shows the non-existence of the non-existing side of the world, while cessation (滅) of the world as how it is correctly seen and understood shows the non-existence of the existing side of the world. That is called the middle way which avoids the two sides......"