It just occurred to me that I had not uploaded my manuscript and slides for my paper.

Do let me know if you have any comments, suggestions, and/or criticism!

Many thanks to Naoya for organising this forum.

See you all again in Kyoto in spring!

Cheers,
Wilson

• Manuscript
• Slides

Can I ask a few questions to clarify?

1. What kind of jumping is "logical jumping"? Is it something like forgoing using one logic for another (one that is perhaps better suited for religious purposes)? Since you express it as a kind of jumping I cannot help but imagine abandoning something for something that is higher. And once you make the jump you don't return to the original? Or can you jump back and forth? Reading Slides 19 and 20, the "jump" sounds more like an "apparent gap",  the two sides being perhaps fundamentally inconsistent but nevertheless compatible. But then jumping is something you do, while gaps are just there.

2. Could you summarize for me what "match of confrontation products" is? I googled but could not find anything. And is there a strong evidence for holding that there is an "influence" from Nicholas of Cusa or Hegel to Kiyozawa rather than mere "connection" or "similarity"?

3. Seeing "Pure Land Buddhism" and "Jumping" immediately made me think of Kierkegaard, particularly about the idea of existential leap, which is essentially a religious jumping. If you are familiar with Kierkegaard, could you say a few things about your thoughts on this?

Thanks!

Itsuki

I will attach the PDF on that conference.  I'd appreciate it if you could comment about my presentation.

I'm looking forward to seeing you again.

Masumi Aoki

• Kiyozawa Manshi

You showed convincingly that the Yijing (I like to follow the pinyin romanization) involves very sophisticated commitment to mathematics and numbers, and so Chinese philosophy, derived from the Yijing in one way or another, qualifies as a fully fledged rational enterprise, given your initial definition of rationality.

I have two questions, one motivated by curiosity and another by etymological concern.

First question. Do you personally believe that rationality is or should be limited to the sense in which you represented it in your presentation? Feminist epistemologists would advocate a much looser understanding (I should probably not say conception) of rationality that allows for historical, cultural and gender variation. I wonder if you would be sympathetic to this kind of orientation.

Second question. I don't know much at all about the etymology of rationality, but upon quick googling I have already come across something that challenges your move from rationality -> ratio -> mathematics (powerpoint pg. 3). Here is the website that I saw: http://english.stackexchange.com/questions/217956/does-rational-come-from-ratio-or-ratio-come-from-rational

Gathering from the conversation there, it seems that the Latin ratio has both mathematical and philosophical meanings, and it is unclear whether they share the same etymology or which is primary. So to frame the question: Is it really very clear that rationality is modeled after, or essentially engaged in, mathematics?

You had 75 slides! Did you manage to go through all of them in the presentation??

Itsuki

I attached pdf file of my presentation "An Mathematical Interpretation of I Ching" in Singapore.

Please give me some comments.

Maiko

• An Mathematical Interpretaion of I Ching (pdf).pdf

As you have pointed out, I think the answer to your question depends on how to understand the notion of “intrinsic nature.” Abhidharmikas are Buddhists, and dependent origination is one of Buddhists’ central claims, so their conception of “intrinsic nature” might be nothing like Madhyamikas were thinking of. That is all I can say for now, since I haven’t read Buddhists literatures enough to answer this.

But, in Sellarsian framework, I might have something more to say (I don’t know whether there is something parallel to this in Buddhist philosophy). Sellars takes roughly a “Kantian” attitude toward the notion of causation; he thinks that causality is dependent upon our use of concepts (or words). 

(P1) If causality is understood in this way, causal dependency implies conceptual dependency.

(P2) If something is conceptually dependent on others (namely, epistemic subjects), it seems that it cannot be said to have an intrinsic nature.

(C) SO, causal dependency and intrinsic nature are mutually exclusive.

I am not sure P2 is really true. Anyway, let me continue on another occasion if anyone is interested.

• 1)    It had better mention Kant’s own examples of ‘judgments of perception and experience’ to make them more understandable.

• 2)    It should be carefully examined whether judgment of perception and its category-free character are compatible or not with the ideas of judgment and categories in the first critique. The latters appear to imply that any judgment, provisionally or not, should be in accordance with categories, logical or real.

• 3)    If there is inconsistency between the first critique’s ideas and the judgment of perception, the mere distinction of two contexts; ‘normative’ and ‘descriptive’, doesn’t clarify the issue at all; it means that transcendental arguments in the ‘normative’ context are incompatible with empirical psychology. Kant and anyone else remain unhappy with this incompatibility. They wish that any psychological distinction between, say, provisional and full fledged judgments are in conform with transcendental arguments.

• 4)    In other words, as far as a tension remains between the ‘normative’ and the ‘descriptive’ contexts, the tension cannot be dispelled by introduction of two ‘contexts’.

• 5)    One promising direction of further research is, I suggest, to admit the tension and to ask its significance in Kantian entire project.

• 6)    Then what significance it can have? My further comments are to be continued, and let me invite anyone to comment on this issue if he or she is interested in it.

Please find my abstract and powerpoint slides below. 

(These slides are of my presentation in Yang-Ming University (2015 NYMU-Kyoto Students Workshop on Mind, Language and Art). 

Because there is no board about the conference, I post my slides on this page.)

Hope to recieve any questions, comments, or/and criticisms from you. 

See you next time in Kyoto!

Best,

Jin

• Judgement of Perception u967du660e.pdf
• Abstract, "Judgment of perception"

Please find my powerpoint slides and paper below. Their structure are slighty differnt, but the main point remains the same. Hope to recieve any suggestions and questions from you guys. See you next year in Kyoto then!

Sincerely,

LIN Fang-Min

• Language in the Realm of the Ultimate Truth.doc
• Language in the Realm of the Ultimate Truth.ppt

I have always been puzzled about the Madhyamaka rejection of intrinsic nature, particularly their argument from dependency (Slide 17). Does the fact that everything arises dependently show that nothing can have intrinsic nature? I also wonder if any Abhidharma-oriented Buddhists really believed that dharmas were independent in the way MAdhyamikas think they did. After all, Abhidharmikas were Buddhists too, and believed in dependent origination. So they would (in fact they do) say that things with intrinsic natures arise from preceding causes and conditions, and indeed come to possess those intrinsic natures dependently on them.

Still, I do think that the argument from conceptual dependency works.

Anyway, my question is: Do you agree that causal dependency and intrinsic nature are mutually exclusive?

I appreciate any comment and/or criticism (especially on my "alternative" interpretations of two truths and two images).

Hope to see you in Kyoto next year!

Ryo

• Ryo Tanaka, %22Two Images of the Worldu2014Sellars and Buddhismu2014%22.pdf

Here are the manuscript of the essay I presented at the conference, and the powerpoint I used during the conference. Let me know if you have any comment, suggestion, and/or criticism. 

And a big thanks to Naoya for organizing this website.

See you all in Kyoto next year,

Best,

Philippe

• Manuscript.docx
• Sartre The necessity of freedom.pdf

please find my paper and PPT slides for the conference as attached, but I am still trying to revise some paragraphs. 

I am looking forward to receive any comments from you. Thank you.

 Chihying

• Reconsideration on the no-thesis view in Nagarjuna's Vigrahavyavartani (revised).pdf
• PPT for the conference.key